The July 17th, 2014 issue of The London Review of Books has a letter from Anil Gomes (Trinity College, Oxford) referencing an article in the June 19th issue of LRB.
It goes to H.A. Prichard's philosophical position, adopted by the so-called Oxford realists.
I won't go into the article or argument here but thought this was pertinent to what happens when Zoam Chomsky and his "opponents" get into discussions here (and elsewhere):
"The Oxford realists held that knowledge was a basic mental state, different in kind from belief and opinion. And whereas opinion could be supported on the basis of evidence, knowledge was a basic apprehension of truths. Someone who disagreed with you, then, couldn’t be argued out of his position by appealing to evidence. Rather, any disagreement could only be the result of one or other party to the dispute – most likely one’s opponent – failing to apprehend what was true clearly and rationally." [Letters, LRB]
RR
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